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Sherman L. Cohn* 
Yale Rosenberg: The Scholar and the Teacher of Jewish Law 
In the early 1980s, when he was a young professor at the 
University of Houston Law Center, I had the occasion to meet 
Yale Rosenberg. It was clear from our discussion that Professor 
Rosenberg had a strong interest in Jewish law as well as a strong 
knowledge base. We discussed teaching such a course at the 
University of Houston Law Center. Professor Rosenberg was 
doubtful about teaching a course in Jewish law at a secular law 
school, particularly one in Texas. But that conversation began a 
series of conversations where Yale explored in some depth the 
course that we were offering at Georgetown. It took several years 
of discussion, but in 1989, Professor Rosenberg took the plunge 
and began offering a Jewish law course to the students at the 
University of Houston Law Center. The rest is a highly 
successful history. 
By 1989, Professor Rosenberg also began to publish in the field, 
co-authoring with his wife, Professor Irene Marker Rosenberg. 
Together, there are ten major articles with a focus on Jewish law. 
But when one examines Professor Yale Rosenberg’s other writings, 
it is clear that the influence of his study and interest in Jewish law 
permeated all of his thinking and scholarship. 
It would take a full volume of this Journal to review all of 
Professor Rosenberg’s writings on Jewish law. But I would like to 
examine, though cursorily, one that illustrates the contribution 
that has been made by Yale and Irene Rosenberg. This one 
article was also written with a third author, Bentzion S. Turin, 
then a student at the University of Houston Law Center, and 
with a significant background in Jewish law. This is the 1999 
article on Return of the Stubborn and Rebellious Son: An 
Independent Sequel on the Prediction of Future Criminality.1
This article takes one of the more difficult biblical 
commandments,2 that appears to require parents to bring 
forward for condemnation to death a son who is rebellious 
against his parents. The article, after setting forth the biblical 
commandment and its context, traces the thinking that went into 
this commandment, as well as its application, through the two 
∗ Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. LL.M., Georgetown 
University Law Center 1960; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center 1957; B.S. in 
Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1954. 
 1. 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 511 (1999). 
 2. Deuteronomy 21:17–21. 
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significant segments of the Talmud, the Mishnah (redacted at the 
end of the second century) and the Gemara (redacted during the 
sixth century), and from there to the significant writings of 
various commentators through the ages. It is a real tour de force. 
The article is a first-rate exposition of the sources of Jewish law 
and how they interrelate. Taking a set of biblical verses, exploring 
both their literal and their contextual meanings, and then moving 
on, through history, with the exposition of how these verses were 
treated in the Talmud and in the writings and responsa since, the 
article moves the reader through a full development of how Jewish 
law works. The biblical word is put forth. But it is not just the 
literal word that is of concern. The context is also important and set 
forth. And from there to the historical development. The sages of 
the Talmudic era worried about the intent as well as the meaning of 
the language. They sought the purpose behind a commandment 
which, read literally, would have parents bring forth their own 
child, charge him with the crime of rebellion, and lead him to his 
death for that crime. As they parsed for intent, the sages of the 
Talmudic era began to focus upon prevention of greater crimes after 
the child became an adult. Thus, there is a concept of predicting the 
future criminal. And, once that intent is arrived at, the sages of old 
begin to place boundaries upon biblical command so that it would 
not be utilized except where the intent would be furthered. This 
journey is then continued with the views of writings of Maimonides 
and Rashi in the Middle Ages through responsa authors of the past 
few centuries. 
From the set of biblical verses, the article develops the 
jurisprudence of Jewish law. A jurisprudence that begins with the 
word of the supreme lawgiver, one that says this is the entire law to 
which one may not add and from which one may not subtract,3 but 
then, building on intent, and utilizing the exegesis of and 
hermeneutics of Jewish law, cabins the commandment so that it is 
to be used in only the most essential situations—if ever. The article 
thus provides an abject lesson of the entire jurisprudence that is 
Jewish law, building logically block upon block toward a conclusion 
that does not negate the biblical command, but utilizes it for the 
positive hortatory that it can serve to help persuade the child who is 
able to discern toward responsibility. In a sense, this 
jurisprudential journey shows how to turn a commandment almost 
on its head: but to accomplish the purpose without the negative 
violence of which it speaks. And in process, the reader learns how 
Jewish law works. 
 3. Deuteronomy 4:2. 
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But the article goes further. Drawing on the jurisprudence of 
Jewish law, the article teaches a lesson concerning prediction of 
criminality. Thus, the lesson of the article is broader than the 
teaching of Jewish law and its system in the context of one 
commandment. It presents an abject lesson about the ability of 
man to predict who in the future will commit a crime. That is the 
issue that the sages of old, and the writers through the ages, 
have wrestled with. And as the article makes clear, it is an issue 
that is still being wrestled in our time. Preventive detention is an 
attempt to lock up those who, from past profile, are likely to 
commit crimes. Our “three strikes and you are out” penology is 
really based on an attempt to predict that here is a person who 
will continue to commit crimes if permitted to do so. And, our 
society is wrestling with the issue of predictability again in terms 
of trying to identify those who, though not yet having committed 
a wrongful act, are lying in wait to commit some terrible terrorist 
act. What this article does is to teach us that the issue is not new, 
it goes back to biblical times and has been wrestled with ever 
since. And from the jurisprudence of the rebellious son, we too 
have much to learn. 
This raises the broader issue of the teaching of Jewish law. In 
1999, after ten years of offering the course at the University of 
Houston Law Center, Professor Yale Rosenberg offered his 
reflections at the Jewish Law Section of the Association of American 
Law Schools (AALS) Annual Meeting. Professor Rosenberg’s
experience mirrored that which I have found at Georgetown. A 
significant number of students who take the course are not Jewish, 
and are exploring the subject from their own perspectives. Some are 
fundamental Christians who are already well versed in the Bible. 
Others are Mormons, exploring their own heritage. (The longest 
continuous running course on Jewish law has been offered at the 
law school at Brigham Young University.) Others are children of, or 
participants in, an intermarriage and are exploring the subject of 
Judaism from this perspective. And still others have a significant 
background in theology or (and they are different) moral theology 
and wish to build upon their already strong bases. Among the 
Jewish students there are generally one or two with significant 
backgrounds in the field, but sometimes rigidly so. However, most 
are exploring a heritage to which they have been barely exposed. 
The number of law schools offering Jewish law courses has 
grown, from just a handful in 1980, to somewhere between thirty 
and forty today, and that number is held in check partially by the 
inability to find qualified teachers. An interesting question arises 
as to why this evolution. Until the 1970s, the emphasis in law 
school was almost exclusively upon those practical courses that 
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were needed for the successful practice of law, including the 
passing of the bar exam. Courses such as ethics, jurisprudence, 
history of law, and the like were considered oddities if offered at 
all.
But the academic legal community has undergone change. In 
the first half of the twentieth century, law schools were almost 
completely under the influence of the Realist and Positivist schools 
of jurisprudence: the law is what has been duly enacted, and in a 
common-law system, what the judge says it is. Leading law schools 
taught solely positive law. Indeed, there was no need to teach 
jurisprudence as there was no issue to be discussed. The same was 
true of ethics. Ethics explores values, and the Realist was not 
interested in a value discussion within the law. But with the study 
of what happened in Europe in the 1940s, there was a realization 
that Germans accomplished the Holocaust—and not just of Jews—
within duly enacted German law. It is said that the Realist school 
floundered upon the shoals of Auschwitz. And the Nuremberg trials 
helped foster a concept that there is a law of general principles that 
trumps positive law when they are in conflict. 
Thus, in the law schools of the 1960s and 1970s, there was a 
re-discovery of values in the law. Law school faculties began to 
ask “Why?” Watergate furthered this process, for many of those 
involved were graduates of first-rank law schools. For the first 
time, the self-appointed leading law schools began to explore 
values and offer courses in which values were explored. And the 
students of the 1970s and beyond were open to such courses, for 
they too were questioning and exploring. 
Thus, attitudes changed. Today, ethics of law practice is a 
must in the studies of the student. But, more, today most law 
schools offer perspective courses that look at the history of the 
law as well as the legal profession, the sociology of the law, and 
subjects as diverse as Law and Literature, Law in Literature, 
and Law in Film. As a part of this broadening, there was an 
opening for other courses that gave breadth and depth, though of 
no practical importance. 
Jewish law fits into this picture. But more was happening. 
For one thing, legal education, which had been quite isolated, 
began to find significance in other disciplines. The interplay of 
law and economics, psychiatry, psychology, philosophy, and even 
physical science began to appear in curricula. Joint teaching with 
members of other disciplines became a sign of maturity. And 
many of the newer recruits to law faculties had PhDs in other 
disciplines along with law degrees. Joint degree programs 
proliferated, bringing both law students and law faculties into 
contact with other disciplines in a meaningful way. 
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Still another influence affects this evolution. Before the 
1970s, the focus was upon assimilation. Historically, legal studies 
were pursued by the establishment (generally, White, Anglo-
Saxon, Protestant and male). Then, between the First and 
Second World Wars, came the Roman Catholics from southern 
and eastern Europe as well as Jews, largely from eastern 
European backgrounds. The emphasis, however, was upon 
assimilation. There was no recognition in American university 
education as a whole, and certainly not in legal education, of any 
value to ethnic studies. This began to change, with the push 
coming largely from the Afro-American Black Pride movement. It 
also came from the Women’s movement. We began to have, at the 
undergraduate, college level, Black studies and Women’s studies 
programs. This made it possible for the Jews, too, to speak of 
wanting to study their own heritage, and Jewish studies 
programs began. 
Thus, we found in the past three decades that it was possible 
to be openly ethnic and still be American. And we found it 
acceptable to study each other’s heritage, which permits non-
Jews to take Jewish law courses. 
Finally, there is another movement, small but important: 
what Professor Russell Pearce has termed the “religious
lawyering movement.”4 In the 1970s, Professor Thomas Schaffer 
of Notre Dame first looked at being a lawyer from the Roman 
Catholic perspective.5 Others joined in from various Christian 
perspectives. This led Jewish academics and lawyers to begin 
exploring what it means to be a Jewish lawyer. Professors 
Russell Pearce,6 Howard Lesnick,7 Monroe Freedman,8 Michael 
Broyde,9 Steven Resnicoff,10 and Samuel Levine11 began to think 
and write on the subject. This paper is not the place to explore 
 4. See Russell G. Peace, The Religious Lawyering Movement: An Emerging Force in 
Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998). 
 5. See Thomas L. Schaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 231 (1979). See generally THOMAS L. SCHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND 
A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT (1981). 
 6. See Russell G. Pearce, Reflections on the American Jewish Lawyer, 17 J.L. & 
RELIGION 179 (2002) (book and essay review). 
 7. See, e.g., Howard Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer in a Pluralist Society, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1469 (1998). 
 8. See Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics from a Jewish Perspective, 27 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 1131 (1996). 
9. See, e.g., Michael J. Broyde, Genetically Engineering People: A Jewish Law 
Analysis of Personhood, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 877 (2001). 
 10. See Steven H. Resnicoff, The Attorney-Client Relationship: A Jewish Law 
Perspective, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 349 (2000). 
 11. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, The Broad Life of the Jewish Lawyer: Integrating 
Spirituality, Scholarship and Profession, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1199 (1996). 
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this fascinating subject in depth.12 I use it solely to show that it 
became respectable in academic legal circles to be a Jew or a 
Catholic or a Mormon or a fundamental Christian openly and to 
explore the law from that perspective as a legitimate academic 
and scholarship subject. 
It is in this era that Yale Rosenberg, with a strong interest 
in Jewish law, began teaching at the University of Houston Law 
Center. It took several years, but in 1989, he finally took the 
plunge and began offering courses in Jewish law. And he found 
among the students a fertile ground. Perhaps, in conclusion, it 
would be best to quote Professor Rosenberg’s own words: 
Finally, a confession and a bit of advice: I was initially very 
reluctant to teach Jewish law. For five years, Sherman 
Cohn, a past chair of this section, urged me to teach the 
course—and I told him I wasn’t a rabbi, I had never studied 
Jewish law other than on a very informal basis at my shul, 
and, in short, I didn’t know enough—and he said, ‘At the 
rate you’re going, you’ll never know enough.’ And so when I 
finally took the plunge, I stepped into the water very 
gingerly. The Talmud is, after all, a sea and a very deep one 
at that, and many have drowned in it. Nonetheless, a 
decade later, I can tell you that even for a water treader 
like me, teaching Jewish law is a remarkable experience 
and a very gratifying one. So my one piece of advice to you, 
if you are thinking about teaching Jewish law, is not to 
make the same mistake that I did. Don’t dawdle. Jump 
right into the sea or the bramble bush of Jewish law as soon 
as possible. You’ll be glad you did—and so will your 
students.13
Yes, Yale Rosenberg took the plunge. He proved to be an 
important scholar as well as a first-rate teacher of the subject. 
He will be missed by his fellow teachers but most of all, by his 
students and those who will have no opportunity of joining with 
him in exploring this fascinating subject. 
 12. See Symposium, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer’s Work: An Interfaith 
Conference, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998), and Symposium, Faith and the Law, 27
TEX. TECH L. REV. 911 (1996), for a collections of views from the perspectives of a large 
variety of faiths. 
 13. Yale Rosenberg, Remarks at the Ass’n of American Law Schools, Annual 
Meeting, Section of Jewish Law (January 1999) (copy of the text of the speech is in the 
possession of the author). 
